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STATE TAX COMMISSION 
OF UTAH, 
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
vs. 
DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE, 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Defendant-Respondent. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
Case No.l4658 
This is an appeal by the Utah State Tax Commission, 
from an Order of the Third District Court, Salt Lake County, 
State of Utah, granting the oral Motion for Summary Judg-
rnent on all issues in favor of the Utah State Department of 
Finance, and denying the Tax Commission's ~lotion for Su.'lllllary 
Judgment. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The plaintiff seeks to have the trial court's Order 
reversed, for an Order declaring Utah Code Annotated, Sec-
tion 31-14-4 (1953) lawful and valid, for an Order granting 
Summary Judgment in favor of the plaintiff and requiring defend-
ant to pay the taxes lawfully due and owing, or in the alterna-
tive to remand the case to the District Court to resolve all 
genuine issues of material fact. 
- 1 -
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S7ATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
The Utah State Tax Commission (hereinafter referred 
to as "Tax Commission" or "plaintiff") is a body politic 
charged with certai~ duties and responsibilities as set forth 
in the Utah State Constitution and the Statutes of the State 
of Utah, including wtah Code Annotated, Section 59-5-46 (1953). 
One of the Tax Commission's primary functions is to see that 
the tax laws are a~~inistered properly. Pursuant to this 
responsibility, the Tax Commission attempted to collect taxes 
which were owing from the State Insurance Fund pursuant to 
Utah Code Annotated, Section 31-14-4 (1953) the relevant 
portions of which, are as follows: 
"Every insurance company engaged in 
the transaction of business in this state 
shall pay to the State Tax Commission, on 
or before the thirty-first day of March in 
each year: 
(1) ..•• (b) A tax of 1% of the total 
premiums receivedby it during the next pre-
ceding calendar year from insurance written 
within this state by any insurance fund or 
funds c~eated by Charter 100, Laws of Utah 
1917, to be collected by the State Tax Com-
mission and to cover into the State Treasury 
to the credit of the State General Fund. 
This tax shall be in addition to any and 
all taxes levied under this section. 
* * * 
(3) Every insurance company engaged 
in the transaction of business in this state 
writing workmen's compensation or occupation-
al disease disability insurance shall pay to 
the state tax commission, on or before the 
thirty-first day of March in each year, a 
tax of 3-1/4% of the total premiums received 
by it during the next preceding calendar year 
from workmen's compensation or occupational 
disease disability insurance, subject to all 
- 2 -
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provisions, limitations and exceptions 
contained in this section. The state tax 
commission shall pay all of the tax collect-
ed except the l/4% into the state treasury 
to the credit of the special fund provided 
for in subsection (1) of section 35-1-68. 
The balance of the tax collected shall be 
paid into the state treasury to the credit 
of the state general fund. No tax that is 
to be transferred into the general fund shall 
be collected on premiums received by the de-
partment of finance in the state insurance 
fund from the state and its several departments 
and from counties, cities, towns, school dis-
tricts, or any other self-insured political 
entities. 
The State Insurance Fund is one alternative from which 
employers may choose, to provide their employees with work-
mens' compensation insurance. The cost of its premiums are 
only fifty to seventy percent of the cost of premiums of the 
other two methods, private insurance carriers and self-insurance. 
The State Insurance Fund (also referred to herein as 
the Fund) is administered by the Utah State Department of Fi-
nance (hereinafter referred to as "Department" or "Defendant"). 
The Department has repeatedly refused to pay the tax imposed 
by U.C.A., Section 31-14-4 (1) (b) (1953), claiming it is uncon-
sti tutional. 
The State Insurance Fund is established, and its opera-
tions are governed and regulated, by Chapter 3 of Title 35 
of the Utah Code Annotated, to which the numbers hereafter 
will largely refer. It has been held by this Court that it "is 
a state-administered mutual insurance program established by 
the Legislature for the purpose of insuring employers against 
liability for compensation and assuring to the persons entitled 
- 3 -
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law." Gronning v.Smart, 561 P.2d 690. The State Insurance 
Fund is a public fund and is publicly administered by a 
public body, the Finance Commission. Chez v. Industrial 
Commission of Utah, 62 P. 2d 549, 90 Utah 447. While 
it is a "public fund" it is also not public money to be 
spent in any manner desired by the public authorities, but 
rather the legislature, in Title 35, Chapter 3, U.C.A., 
has set forth the relationship between the State Insurance 
Fund and other state agencies. 
The State Insurance Fund is very unique as it is 
literally in a class by itself. While it is similar to pri-
vate insurnace companies in that it is set up and established 
to provide compensation to injured parties and to protect 
other parties against potential liabilities, it is also 
riers and self-insurance. 
The State Insurance Fund (also referred to herein 
as the Fund) is adninstered by the Utah State ~epartment 
of Finance (hereinafter referred to as "Depar~~ent" or 
"Defendant"). The Department has repeatedly refused to 
pay the tax imposed by U.C.A., Section 31-14-4(1) (b) (1953), 
_claiming it is unconstitutional. 
- A -
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The State Insurance Fund is established, and its 
operations are governed and regulated, by Chapter 3 of 
Title 35 of the Utah Code Annotated, to which the numbers 
hereafter will largely refer. It has been held by this Court 
that it "is a state-administered mutual insurance program 
established by the Legislature for the purpose of insuring 
employers against liability for compensation and assuring 
to the persons entitled thereto the compensation provided by 
law." Gronning v.Smart, 561 P.2d 690. The State Insurance 
Fund is a public fund and is publicly administered by a 
public body, the Finance Commission. Chez v. Industrial 
Commission of Utah, 62 P. 2d 549, 90 Utah 447. While 
it is a "public fund" it is also not public money to be 
spent in any manner desired by the public authorities, but 
rather the legislature, in Title 35, Chapter 3, U.C.A., 
has set forth the relationship between the State Insurance 
Fund and other state agencies. 
The State Insurance Fund is very unique as it is 
literally in a class by itself. While it is similar to pri-
vate insurnace companies in that it is set up and established 
to provide compensation to injured parties and to protect 
other parties against potential liabilities, it is also 
-5-
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very dissimilar in all other respects, and some of the 
unique characteristics of the Fund are as follows: 
1. The Fund is established as a non-r~ofit organ-
ization so that the premiums need not be high enc .. Jh 
to produce a profit, but only to cover the claims 
which are filed by injured employees against the Fund. 
2. The Fund does not have any investors or share-
holders who require a return on their investment. 
3. The Fund does not employ salesmen who earn com-
missions, so no sales commissions are paid by the Fund. 
4. The administrative expenses of the Fund are 
provided by way of appropriation from the resour~es 
of the Fund by the legislature, but they are reduced 
substantially below those expenses for private insur-
ance companies because: 
a. The commission of finance administers the 
fund, writes compensation insurance and conducts all 
of the business appertaining thereto. Section~-3-3, 
U.C.A. 
b. The commission of finance must rate the haz-
ards relating to accidents and occupational diseases; 
and must establish the premiums for those hazards. 
Section 35-3-4, U.C.A. 
c. The commission of finance must make agree-
ments for the settlement of claims, compromise claims 
of doubtful validity and determine to whom and through 
whom payments are to be made. Section 35-3-5, U.C.A. 
- r, -
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d. The commission of finance must issue the 
policies of insurance and must prepare all of the nec-
essary forms, agreements and policies. Section 35-3-6, 
U.C.A. 
e. The commission of finance must receive all 
of the premiums paid to the fund and must then trans-
mit those funds to the State Treasurer. Section 35-3-7, 
U.C.A. 
f. The commission of finance must receive 
the written notices of withdrawal from any employer 
withdrawing from the Fund. Section 35-3-8, U.C.A. 
g. The commission of finance has the respon-
sibility to determine if any of the risks should be 
reinsured with any other insurance carrier and to 
then enter into any necessary reinsurance agreements. 
Section 35-3-9, U.C.A. 
h. The commission of finance has the full 
responsibility to establish the appropriate rates, 
set up and maintain an adequate reserve, and to keep 
an accurate record of the premiums received, the 
administration expenses, the claims disbursed, and 
must further keep separate records for each individual 
employer. Section 35-3-10, u.c.A. 
i. The commission of finance must adopt and 
promulgate all of the necessary rules and regulations. 
Section 35-3-11, U.C.A. 
- 7 -
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j. The commission of finance has the responsi-
bility to collect, by civil action in court if neces-
sary, apy amounts owed to the Fund by any employer. 
Section 35-3-17, U.C.A. 
k. The State Treasurer is the custodian of 
the Fund, and must wisely invest those funds and must 
then issue the appropriate vouchers on the Fund. 
Sections 35-3-12 and 13, U.C.A. 
1. The State Insurance Fund is provided with 
free legal counsel by the state Attorney General and 
by the various county attorneys. Section 35-3-20, 
u.c.A. 
m. Audits on the State Insurance Fund are per-
formed by the State Auditor, presumably without charge, 
whereas private insurance companies must retain an in-
dependent certified public accounting firm to perform 
audits. 
5. While Section 35-3-1, U.C.A, does provide that 
the administrative expenses are to be provided by legisla-
tive appropriation from the resources of the Fund, the re-
cord in this case does not disclose what amounts, if any, were 
appropriated by the legislature to pay for those administra-
tive expenses, nor does the record in this case disclose the 
amounts of such administrative expenses for any of the years 
in question. 
6. Insurance companies, which pay a Utah insurance 
premium tax, including the State Insurance Fund, are exempt 
- 8 -
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7. Largely because of the factors cited above, 
the State Insurance Fund has been able to provide the in-
surance to employers for only fifty (50) per cent to seventy 
(70) per cent of the ?remiums which are otherwise charged 
by private insurance carriers. 
8. Prior to 1971, when the statute in question 
in this proceeding was enacted by the legislature, the State 
Insurance Fund paid a lower total premium tax than private 
insurance carriers because the Fund did not pay a premium tax 
on premiums received from governmental agencies or political 
subdivisions, nor on the occupational disease disability 
portion of the premi~rn received from other employers, whereas, 
?rivate insurance carriers did pay a premium tax on those 
premiums. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE DIFFE?.E~CE IN TAX RATES BETWEEN THE 
STATE INSU~~CE FUND AND OTHER PRIVATE INSUR-
ANCE CARRIERS IS BECAUSE OF THE ADDITIONAL 
BENEFITS A~D SERVICES WHICH ARE PROVIDED TO 
THE STATE I~SURANCE FUND BY THE STATE AND 
ITS OFFICERS AND AGENCIES, AND DIFFERENCES 
IN TAXES ARE PERFECTLY ACCEPTABLE t•lHEN 
THERE IS ALSO A DIFFERENCE IN THE BENEFITS 
AND SERVICES PROVIDED BY THE TAXING AUTHOR-
ITY. 
As mentioned, the Fund is a non-profit, publicly-
administered insurance plan designed to provide employers 
with relatively inexpensive workmen's compensation insur-
ance. The Fund is able to offer lower premiums because of 
two basic reasons. First, the Fund, as a creation of the 
- 9 -
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State Legislature which was provided its initial capital 
by legislative appropriation, does not have shareholders who 
must be provided with an annual return on investment, and 
secondly, and most importantly, the State of Utah pro-
vides many services to the Fund \vhich are not provided 
to any other private insurance company or self-insurer. 
A prime example of those additional services which 
are provided to the Fund by the State of Utah without any 
direct charge is that the Fund has received free legal 
servicesin this case as well as in Gronning v. Smart, 
supra. As this Court is well aware, legal services can be 
very expensive and free legal counsel constitutes a sub-
stantial benefit to the Fund, which by its genesis, func-
tion, and purpose is a litigious type of organizati.on. 
Further, if the Fund does receive free auditing and invest-
ment services by the State Auditor and State Treasurer, 
those are very valuable services and benefits to an organ-
ization in a fiduciary capacity with large amounts of funds 
to invest and for which to account. If these services were 
not provided free of charge, then the Fund,as is necessary 
with private insurance carriers, would have to hire highly 
paid executive employees to invest the funds, and would also 
have to hire a certified public accounting firm to perform 
an audit on the books and records of the Fund. 
Because the state provides these services and bene-
fits to the State Insurance Fund, it can also require the Fund 
to help support their cost through the use of taxation, and 
- 10 -
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that rate of taxation may be different when additional 
services are provided than it would be for other insurers 
for which those services are not provided. 
In Union Pacific Railroad Company v. The City and 
County of Denver, 182 Colo. 136, 511 P. 2d 497 (1973), 
plaintiffs contended that the tax imposed upon them, which 
was based upon the number of employees working in Denver, was 
unconstitutional because it placed an undue burden on in-
terstate commerce. The court disagreed by upholding the 
ordinance in question. The Court, in quoting from a 
United States Supre~e Court decision, Wisconsin v. J. c. 
Penney Co., 311 U. S. 435, 61 S. Ct. 246, 85 L. Ed. 267 
(1940), stated: 
"For constitutional purposes the 
decisive issue turns on the operating in-
cidence of a challenged tax. A state is 
free to pursue its own fiscal policies, un-
embarrassed by the constitution, if by the 
practical ooeration of a tax the state has 
exerted its power in relation to opportun-
ities w~ich it has oiven, to protection · 
which it has afforded, to benefits which 
it has conferred by the fact of being an 
orderly civilized society. 
* * * * * 
The simple but controlling question is 
whether- the state has given anything for 
which it can ask return. (at page 499) 
(emphasis added.) 
The Court added that the tax was not on the privilege of 
doing interstate business but on the privilege of using 
services and facilities provided by the City of Denver. 
- 11 -
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"The clear purpose of the tax is to 
require that businesses located within Denver 
pay a fair s~are of the expenses incurred 
by Denver in ?roviding those services and fa-
cilities." (at page 499) (emphasis add"'d.) 
The tax in our present situation, although fac-
tually different, is based on the same reasoning. The 
State Legislature is requiring those who receive the 
benefits of the State Insurance Fund to help meet the 
expenses the state incurs by providing the various ser-
vices set forth in the statement of facts. 
An earlier Utah case pronounced this court's 
adherence to that principle. In Garrett Freight Lines v. 
State Tax Commission, 103 Utah 390, 135 P. 2d 523 (1943), 
the Court declarec: 
"Taxation is neither a penalty im-
posed on the taxpayer nor a liability which 
he assumes by contract. It is but a way of 
apportioning the cost of government among 
those who in some measure are privileged to 
enjoy its benefits and must bear its burdens." 
(Page 526). 
Whether or not the tax reflects the exact amount 
of benefits received is of little import unless the tax is 
not a fair approximation or is discriminatory or excessive. 
The court in the Union Pacific case, again quoting from 
the U. S. Supreme Court (in the case of Evansville-Vander-
burgh Airport Authority District v. Delta Airlines, 405 
U. S. 707, 92 S. Ct. 1349, 31 L. Ed. 2d 620 (1972) added: 
-12 -
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" [\·l] !"lile state or local tolls must 
reflect a 'uniform, fair and practical stand-
ard' relating to public expenditures, it 
is the amount of the tax, not its formula, 
that is o= central concern. At least so long 
as the toll is based on some fair approxima-
tion of use or privilege for use • . and is 
neither discriminatory against interstate 
commerc.2 :10r excessive in comparison \'lith the 
governmental benefit conferred, it \vill pass 
constitutional muster, even though some other 
formula might reflect more exactly the relative 
use of the state facilities by individual users." 
(Page 499) 
There exists no rule which requires a state to 
impose a tax exactly equal to the expenditures spent by 
the state in maintaini:1g a particular program. Further, 
the state is not required to use the best plan or form-
ula for imposition of a tax. It may use any plan that 
is not oppressive or excessive and which reasonably reflects 
a close approximation of services provided. 
Apparently, the State Insurance Fund wants the 
best of everything. It wants lower insurance premiums, low 
cost administrative services, free legal services, free au-
diting services, free investment services, and lower or 
equal taxes. Unfortunately, services are never free. And 
as a result, those receiving the benefits of the services 
must pay for them. 
This principle was discussed by the Utah Supreme 
Courtin Salt Lake City v. Bennion Gas and Oil, 80 Utah 530, 
15 P. 2d 648 (1932). Although the case involved an inspec-
tion fee rather than an occupation tax, the dicta in the 
opinion is applicable. 
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"The amount of the inspection charge 
is primarily with the Legislature and a 
statute will not be held unconstitutional 
as providing for an excessive charge unless 
~t ~s so unreasonable and disproportionate 
to the service rendered as to attack the 
good faith of the law. * * *" (Cite omit-
ted) (Page 650) (Emphasis added). 
The court, in discussing the fee, declared: 
"If expenses are incurred in the 
exercise of this police power, some one 
must pay them, and it is only fair that 
the private corporation enjoying the fran-
chise and serving the public for profit 
should bear this burden." (at page 649) 
While a distinction may exist between an inspec-
tion fee and an occupation tax, the principle behind the 
two is the same; namely, the party receiving t.he service 
should be required to pay for it. 
The additional one percent (1%) tax imposed upon 
the State Insurance Fund is the Legislature's method of ap-
portioning the costs of the services being rendered, and that 
tax should be upheld by this honorable court. 
POINT II 
THE LEGISLATURE HAS BROAD DISCRETION IN MAK-
ING CLASSIFICATIONS FOR PURPOSES OF LEGIS-
LATION, ESPECIALLY IN THE AREA OF OCCUPATION 
TAXES. 
The Legislature is endowed with broad powers to 
determine legislative policy. In Sonitrol Northwest, Inc. 
v. City of Seattle, 528 P. 2d 474, 84 Wash. 2d 588 (1975), 
the Court, supportive of this position, stated: 
- 14 -
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"Legislative bodies have very exten-
sive powers to make classifications for pur-
poses of legislation." [citations omitted.) 
And in 0. G. Sansone Co. v. Department of Transportation, 
127 Cal. Rptr. 799, 55 Cal. App. 3d 458 (1976), the Court 
added: 
"[T]he legislature is vested with wide 
discretion in making the classification and ••• 
its decision as to what is a sufficient dis-
tinction to warrant the classification will not 
be overthrown by the courts unless it is palpa-
bly arbitrary and beyond rational doubt errone-
ous. [citations) •••• The legislature need 
not treat similar evils identically or legislate 
as to all phases of a field at once [citation); 
• • • a classification is not void because it 
does not embrace within it every other class 
which might be included [citation)." 
When the legislature makes certain classifications, those 
classifications are presumed valid. This policy has been 
considered and supported numerous times by the Utah su-
preme Court. 
In Lehi City v. Meiling, City Recorder, 87 Utah 
237, 48 P. 2d 530 (1935), it was stated: 
"In approaching the subject we have 
in mind the rule that when an act of the 
legislature is attacked on grounds of un-
constitutionality the question presented is 
not whether it is possible to condemn the 
act, but whether it is possible to uphold 
it. The presumption is always in favor 
of validity, and legislative enactments 
must be sustained unless clearly in viola-
tion of fundamental law. Wadsworth v. San-
taquin City, 83 Utah 321, 28 P. 2d 161. 
Every presumption will be indulged in favor 
of legislation and only clear and demonstra-
ble usurpation of power will authorize ju-
dicial interference with legislative ac-
tion. Green v. Frazier, 253 U. S. 233, 40 
S. Ct. 499, 64 L. Ed. 878." (at page 247) 
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Section 31-14-4, U.C.A. (1953) is entitled to a presumption 
of validity. Unless respondents can clearly show that this 
section of the code is unconstitutional, it must stand. 
Concerning the legislature's use uf discretion 
in making laws, the courts generally allow the legislature 
even greater latitude than usual in the area of taxation; 
especially when the purpose of the tax is to increase rev-
enue. In Menlove v. Salt Lake County, 18 Utah 2d 203, 
418 P. 2d 227 (1966) the plaintiff urged the court to 
declare an ordinance unconstitutional which imposed a 
transient room tax upon innkeepers. In upholding the ord-
inance this court classified the tax as an occupation tax 
which was levied in order to increase revenue. The court, 
quoting from a prior U. S. Supreme Court decision, New York 
Rapid Transit Corporation v. City of New York, 303 U. S. 573, 
58 S. Ct. 721, 728, 82 L. Ed. 1024 (1938) stated: 
"The power to make distinctions exists 
with full vigor in the field of taxation, 
where no 'iron rule' of equality has ever 
been enforced upon the states. [citations omit-
ted] A state may exercise a wide discretion 
in selecting the subjects of taxation [cita-
tions omitted] particularly as respects occu-
pation taxes, [citations omitted]. * * * (at 
page 230) 
The court added: 
"The constitutional provision which 
imposes equality and uniformity of taxation 
of property has no application to an occupation 
tax." (at page 229). (Emphasis added) 
[See also Davis v. Ogden City, 117 Utah 315, 215 P. 2d 616 
(1950) .] The court further stated: 
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"Where neither the constitution nor a 
statute imposes absolute restrictions on 
the power of taxation, the courts mav not ar-
bitrarily impose any, unless it clea~ly appears 
that the tax imposed is oppressive or clearly 
and unreasonably discriminatory, and this is 
an abuse of the taxing power. This court can-
not set up its judgment against that of the 
legislature in determining who shall be re-
quired to contribute to the revenues." (at 
page 229) 
Clearly the burden of proof is on the respondents. They 
must show that the tax imposed by Section 31-14-4 is oppres-
sive or unreasonably discriminatory. This has certainly 
not been done in this case because no evidence whatever has 
been presented to the court. The nature of the tax in 
question, since it is not a property tax, does not require 
equality and uniformity. The legislature has not abused 
its taxing power simply because the rate of taxation as-
sessed against the premiums paid into the State Insurance 
fund is not identical to that imposed upon private carri-
ers. More must be proved than a difference in the rate of 
taxation to show that the legislature has overstepped its 
bounds. The principle involved in this tax is very similar 
to federal and state personal and corporate income taxes 
where the tax rate differs based on differing levels of 
income, but with no other distinctions in classification. 
The passage of Section 31-14-4 and the creation of the 
State Insurance Fund as its own classification was well 
within the legislature's power to make laws and therefore 
is valid. 
- 17 -
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POINT III 
SECTION 31-14-4, U.C.A., IS A GENERAL LMJ, 
NOT A SPECIAL ONE. 
The term "general laws" was defined in State 
v. Kallas, 97 Utah 492, 94 P. 2d 414 (1939), citing from 
25 R. C. L. 814, as follows: 
"Constitutional law--what are general 
laws. Laws which apply to and operate uniform-
ly upon all members of any class of persons 
peculiar to themselves in the matters covered 
by the laws in question, are general and not 
special. (emphasis added) (at page 505) 
In the Lehi City case, supra, the act being chal-
lenged created a metropolitan water district. It was urged 
that this enactment was a special law rather than a gener-
al one and hence violated Article VI, Section 26 of the 
Utah State Constitution. In rejecting this contention, the 
Utah Supreme Court stated: 
"The mere fact that its benefits may, 
under present opportunities and conditions, 
be availed of by a part of the state only, 
does not mitigate against its validity as a 
general law. City of Pasadena v. Chamberlain, 
supra. While only one group of cities or 
towns may now attempt to organize under its 
provisions, yet at any future time other 
cities and towns may do likewise. The act is 
not limited to any particular cities or towns, 
or to any particular locality in the state, 
but it operates uniformly on every city or town 
which may choose to take advantage of its pro-
visions. In form, as well as in substance, 
1t 1s a general law and not special. Salt Lake 
City v. Salt Lake County, 60 Utah 423, 209 P. 
207; In Re Orosi Public Utility District, 196 
Cal. 43, 235 P. 1004. (Emphasis added) (at 
page 249) 
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that this enactmen~ was a special law rather than a gener-
al one and hence violated Article VI, Section 26 of the 
Utah State Constit~~ion. In rejecting this contention, the 
Utah Supreme Court stated: 
"The mere fact that its benefits may, 
under prese~t opportunities and conditions, 
be availed of by a part of ~he state only, 
does not mitigate against its validity as a 
general la>·;. City of Pasadena v. Chawerlain, 
supra. While only one group of cities or 
towns may now attempt to organize under its 
provisions, yet at any future time other 
cities and towns may do likewise. The act is 
not limited to any particular cities or towns, 
or to any carticular locality in the state, 
but it operates uniformly on every city or town 
which may c~oose to take adv~ntage of its pro-
visions. I~ form, as well as in substance, 
it is a general law and not special. Salt Lake 
City v. Salt Lake County, 60 Utah 423,-209 P. 
207; In Re Orosi Public Utility District, 196 
Cal. 43, 235 P. 1004. (Emphasis added) (at 
page 249) 
In comparing this language to the present case it 
can be seen that Section 31-14-4 is limited at the present 
time to only the State Insurance Fund. However, not one 
employer is forced to participate. They do so because they 
find the State Insurance Fund more advantageous than the 
other alternatives, even with a slightly higher premium 
tax. The program is open to any employer who wishes to 
join. The State Insurance Fund is not administered in a 
manner which unfairly discriminates among employers. True, 
there is a distinction made between the Fund and private 
insurance carriers. But, as long as that distinction does 
not allow a person to exercise the privileges it offers while 
refusing it to another of like qualifications and under 
- 19 -
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like circumstances and conditions, it is not objection-
able. 
Section 31-14-4 is a general law and not a Special 
law, and is therefore constitutional. 
POINT IV. 
SECTION 31-14-4 DOES NOT VIOLATE THE EQUAL 
PROTECTION OR DUE PROCESS CLAUSE OF THE 
FOURTEENTH ru~NDMENT. 
A statute is violative of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment if it is unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious. If 
there is any reasonable set of facts which might sustain 
the act, it is to be found constitutional. Sonitrol North-
west, Inc. v. City of Seattle, 528 P. 2d 474, 84 Wash. 2d 
588 (1975). The burden of proof is on the one claiming 
the law to be discriminatory. 
In 0. G. Sansone Co. v. Department of Transportation, 
127 Cal. Rptr. 799, 55 Cal. App. 3d 434 (1976), the court 
found that a statute permitting the Departnent of Transpor-
tation to withhold payments to contractors whose subcon-
tractors had failed to pay their workers minimum wages was 
not unconstitutional. Plaintiffs in that case contended 
that the minimum wage law discriminated against public works 
contractors because it did not apply to contractors work-
ing on private construction projects. In response to this, 
the court, quoting from an earlier case, declared: 
"Public agencies, generally speaking, 
afford a proper subject for legislative classi-
fication. [citation]." 
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The court also added: 
"The Legislature may constitution-
ally single out a particular segment of 
industry for regulation without necessar-
ily running afoul of the equal protection 
clauses of the state and federal consti-
tutions." (At page 816) 
The dicta in this case suggests that the Legislature 
may constitutionally single out a particular segment of 
an industry for regulation and it may also draw dis-
tinctions between public and private agencies for the 
purposes of classification. This being true, the Utah 
Legislature did not overstep its bounds in enacting 
Section 31-14-4. It is perfectly permissible to separ-
ately classfy those employers who belong to the State 
Insurance Fund and those who insure their workers pri-
vately. This classification is not unreasonable simply 
becauseoneis administered publicly and the others pri-
vately. This distinction becomes even more reasonable 
when the purpose of the classification is for taxation. 
As was nentioned in the ~1enlove case, the Leg-
islature has even broader power to make classifications 
for the purpose of taxation than it does in general. Un-
less the classification is unreasonable or arbitrary, 
the court must uphold it. In The State of Utah v. Samuel 
s. Taylor, 541 P. 2d 1124 (Utah 1975), the defendant as-
serted that he was denied equal protection of the law 
because the ordinance of which he complained discriminated 
against small businessmen. The ordinance required busi-
nesses to pay a license fee, the amount of which depended 
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upon the gross income of the particular business. "De-
fendant argues that this system of taxation casts a dis-
proportionate burden on the small businessman and thus 
violatesthe equal protection clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment." The Utah Supreme Court, in quoting from a 
United States Supreme Court decision which upheld a similar 
occupation tax, declared: 
"The court stated that the rule of equal-
ity of the Fourteenth Amendment does not re-
quire exact equality of taxation, but only that 
the law imposing the tax shall operate on all 
under the same circumstances. The Court ruled 
that where a tax on the privilege of doing busi-
ness was graded according to the value, it may 
not be deemed inequal in operation solely because 
it does not levy the same percentage on every dol-
lar." (emphasis added) (at page 1125) 
The Utah Supreme Court added: 
"The United States Supreme Court has ad-
hered to this interpretation that the equal pro-
tection clause imposes no iron rule of equality 
upon the states in the exercise of their taxing 
power. The state is not required to resort to 
close distinctions or to maintain a precise, sci-
entific uniformity with reference to composition, 
use, or value." (at page 1125) 
The Court further stated: 
"Under a taxing statute, if the exempted 
persons or businesses may be included in a dis-
tinct class, then the equal protection of the 
laws has not been denied to those taxed. There 
is nothing unreasonable in the legislative de-
termination to designate the insurance business 
as a distinct class and to create a separate 
scheme of taxation therefor." (at page 1126) 
It seems rather apparent that the Legislature has 
broad power in enacting tax statutes. As stated in the 
Taylor case, it also has the power to create a separate 
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scheme of taxation for the insurance business. Section 
31-14-4 is part of that taxation scheme. It is not arbi-
trary or capricious but is based on distinctions designed 
to increase revenue to pay for increased expenses without 
substantially adversely affecting any interested party. 
In support of this policy, the Court in Texas 
Company v. Cohn, 112 P. 2d 522, 8 Wash. 2d 376 (1941), 
stated: 
"~\'hen the rule is applied to a tax 
law, however, it should be done with due ap-
preciation of the fact that usually the prin-
cipal object, and very often the sole object 
of such a law, is to raise revenue for the 
support of the taxing government. Thus, 
the state may constitutionally tax one 
class and exempt other classes if the clas-
sification reasonably tends, in some la..,rful 
way, to facilitate the raising of revenue." 
(at page 529) 
And in the Sonitrol case, supra, the Court said: 
" ..• [T]he object sought is the 
raising of revenue and so long as the rate 
is not so excessive as to be confiscatory, 
the tax is valid." (at page 477) 
What is confiscatory? In the Sonitrol case, the 
plaintiff alleged that a Seattle ordinance was discrimin-
atory and confiscatory. Plaintiff manufactured burglar 
alarms and was taxed at a rate of 70 times that of its 
competitors, who dealt in local alarms. Its tax was 7% 
compared to the 1/10 of 1% imposed upon the other companies. 
The Court held that the tax was not unreasonable. 
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"The fact that the higher tax rate on 
appellant's business may put him at a competi-
tive disadvantage is of no moment. [citation] 
"Only where a tax is confiscatory and in-
tended to drive a class out of business altogeth-
er, will the competitive element be considered. 
[citation]" (at page 478) 
The tax in the present case was just the opposite 
effect. It tends to distribute the taxes more evenly. As 
previously mentioned, the tax imposed by Section 31-14-4 
is based on the amount of premiums paid by the employers. 
However, the premiums paid by those employers who belong to 
the State Insurance Fund is only 50 to 70% of the premiums 
paid by employers to private insurance carriers. To place 
the same rate of taxation on both groups seems grossly unfair. 
In effect, respondents are demanding the best of both worlds. 
They want lower premiums and lower taxes, even though they 
may be insuring the same occupational risks. 
Applying Section 31-14-4 as it now stands, look at 
a hypothetical. Assume that a lineman working for a power 
company has premiums on his wages of $1000.00 to a private 
insurance carrier. The tax on those premiums is 3-1/4% or 
$32.50. If that same lineman's employer had purchased its in-
surance coverage through the State Insurance Fund, the prem-
iums would have been 50 to 70% of that paid to the private 
carrier or $500.00 to $700.00. The tax on that amount is 
4-~/4%or $21.25 to $29.75. Even with the additional one per-
cent the taxes to the State Tax Commission are still less for 
the same risk. Apparently, the Legislature has attempted 
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AQditio~ally, a differen~e in the method of con-
duc~i~g a business ~as been upheld as a valid basis for 
taxatic::1. In Cit\· c:: San Hateo v. Mullin, 59 Ca 2d 652, 
139 P. 2d 351 (1943), the city passed an ordinance which re-
quired attorneys, a"o::1g others, to pay an annual license 
tax. If two or more attorneys worked together the addition-
al tax on every attorney over one was less than t..'lat paid for 
the license of the first attorney. This ordinance was at-
tacked as being discriminatory and unconstitutional. The 
ordinance was upheld by the Court declaring it t~ ~E oased 
on a reasonable classification. The Court also added: 
"A difference in the method of conducting 
a business is generally a sound basis for classi-
fication, particularly if it appears that the 
tax was fixed in proportion to the amount of busi-
ness, which ~ay be determined by different but 
reasonable nethods. [cite omitted] (Page 353) 
Further the Court reasoned: 
"The method of operation resulting in 
superior or more convenient service furnishes a 
reason for a distinct and separate classifica-
tion. The power to license a business for the 
purpose of revenue involves the right to make 
distinctions between essentially different meth-
ods of conducting the same general character of 
business." (page 353) 
It would seem that this reasoning is applicable 
to the case at bar. The services provided by the state 
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make the State Insurance Fund more convenient and attrac-
tive to potential members. It is able to offer lower ~re-
miums because it is not profit-oriented, and yet, it is in 
direct competition with private carriers. This distinction 
alone should provide a sufficient basis for taxation. 
It is hard to believe that a 1% difference in taxa-
tion is unconstitutional when a difference of 70 times has 
been upheld. One percent isnotconfiscatory especially when 
the end result is to more evenly tax identical risks. 
In Sonitrol Northwest, Inc. v. City of Seattle, 528 
P. 2d 474, 84 Wash 2d 588 (1975), the Court summed up its 
responsibility in this type of case. 
"It is not the function of this court 
in cases like the present to consider the propri-
ety or justness of the tax, to seek for the mo-
tives, or to criticize the public policy which 
prompted the adoption of the legislation. Our 
duty is to sustain the classification adopted 
by the Legislature if there are substantial dif-
ferences between the occupations separately class-
ified. Such differences need not be great. The 
past decisions of the court make this abundantly 
clear." (at page 478) 
In the present case, the tax exacted is neither confiscatory 
nor unreasonable. It does not violate the equal protection 
or due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. There-
fore, Section 31-14-4 should be declared valid. 
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POINT V 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ITS GRANTING OF DE-
FENDANT'S MOTION FOR SU~1ARY JUDGMENT BECAUSE 
THERE WERE STILL GENUINE ISSUES OF FACT WHICH 
NEEDED TO BE RESOLVED BEFORE A SUMHARY JUDGlli:NT 
COULD BE GRANTED IN FAVOR OF THE DEPART1-1ENT 
OF FINANCE. 
In Bullock v. Deseret Dodge Truck Center, Inc. 11 
Utah 2d 1, 354 P. 2d 559 (1960), this court stated the prin-
ciple to be followed by the trial court when ruling on a 
motion for summary judgment. 
"A sUini!\ary judgment must be supported 
by evidence, admissions and inferences 
which when viewed in the light most favor-
able to the loser shows that, 'there is no 
genuine issue as to any material fact and 
that the moving party is entitled to a 
judgment as a matter of law.' Such showing 
must preclude all reasonable possibility 
that the loser could, if given a trial, 
produce evidence which would reasonably sus-
tain a judgment in his favor." 
[See also Morris v. Farnsworth Hotel, 123 Utah 289, 259 P. 2d 
297, 298 (1953).] In essence, the court said that if any 
material fact is in dispute or if the losing party could show 
facts under which it would be entitled to judgment, then the 
Court must deny the motion for summary judgment. 
In the present case both of these grounds exist. 
To begin with, before a summary judgment could be granted in 
favor of the defendant, the Court would have to determine wheth-
er sufficient distinctions exist between the State Insurance 
Fund and private insurance carriers to justify the Legislature 
adopting separate classifications for purposes of taxation. 
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This question was never resolved at the trial level. 
Additionally, several issues which would have a bear-
ing on the question of sufficient differences between the two 
types of insurance programs were left unanswered. First, does 
L~e State Insurance Fund pay a portion of the State Treasurer's 
salary since by law he is the custodian of the Fund's accounts 
and he is required to invest the Fund's monies, or is his sal-
ary completely paid for by the State? Second, does the Fund 
pay for any of its legal services or are they all provided with-
out cost by the Attorney General's Office? Third, the Director 
of Finance administers the State Insurance Fund. Does he receive 
compensation from the Fund for these services or is his entire 
salary paid for by the state? The same question could also be 
asked of the state employees who are directly under his super-
vision and control. Additionally, the record does not disclose 
exactly how the premiums for the State Insurance Fund relate 
to thepremiums of private insurance carriers, or how the tax 
cost of a specific risk with the State Insurance Fund would 
compare and relate to the tax cost of that same risk with a 
private insurance carrier. 
The Legislature presumably appropriates money to admin-
ister the State Insurance Fund from the monies of the Fund, 
but are they sufficient? Is the state partially subsidizing 
the program by way of additional money or through the form of 
free services? None of these questions were answered in the 
trial court. It appears that if any of these questions could 
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be answered in a light more favorable to the plaintiff then 
defendant's motion for summary judgment was granted prema-
turely and in error. In In Re Williams' Estates, 10 Utah 2d 
83, 348 P. 2d 683, 685 (1960) the Court said that summary 
judgment is only proper if the pleadings, affidavits, etc. 
show there is no genuine issue of material fact and that 
the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 
The moving party in our present case was not entitled to judg-
ment as a matter of law. If the answers to the questions 
raised herein would show that the State Insurance Fund does 
in fact receive benefits from the state or would in any other 
way place the case of the State Tax Commission in a more favor-
able light, then defendant was not entitled to summary judg-
ment. On the other hand, it is submitted that the statute 
on its face, when reviewed with the relevant provisions of the 
law, could have been, and should have been, upheld as valid 
by the lower court. Therefore, while the plaintiff-appellant 
believes that this honorable court should rule affirmatively 
in its favor, at the very least, the case should be remanded 
to the trial court for a determination of the genuine issues 
of fact which are still in issue in these proceedings. 
CONCLUSION 
The Legislature has been given broad powers in 
making classifications for the purpose of legislation. These 
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legislative decisions are entitled to a presumption of valid-
ity and must be upheld unless it is shown that they are palpa-
bly unreasonable. It is submitted that the legislature has 
determined that a slightly higher tax should be paid because 
of the additional benefits and services received by the Fund. 
Section 31-14-4 is not unconstitutional simply be-
cause it makes a distinction between the State Insurance 
Fund and private insurance carriers. It must be assumed 
that employers considered the advantages as well as the dis-
advantages of both programs before deciding which to partici-
pate in. 
Under Section 31-14-4, employers actually pay the 
same or a lesser amount of tax for insuring the same type of 
risk. The one percent difference in rates cannot be considered 
arbitrary or confiscatory. Section 31-14-4 must be upheld 
as a valid exercise of power by the legislature. 
Therefore, it is submitted that this honorable 
court should hold that Section 31-14-4(1} (b) is valid and 
constitutional on its face, or should remand this case to 
the District Court to make determinations on the unresolved 
issues of fact. 
::;;;~.1 
G. BLAINE DAVIs0 
Assistant Attorney General 
236 State Capitol 
Salt ~ake City, Utah 84114 
Attorney for Plaintiff-AppelU~ 
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